Senate amendment makes the following changes to 2nd edition as amended. Removes previous amendment #1, which included a bail bondsman in the definition of law enforcement officer. Rewrites proposed GS 14-51.2 to include new subsection (e1) providing that a person who uses force, as permitted in the statute, is justified in using such force and is immune from civil or criminal liability for the use of such force unless the person against whom the force is used is a bail bondsman acting in the lawful performance of his or her official duties, and who has made his or her status as a bail bondsman known or the person using force should have known the individual was a bail bondsman.

Senate committee substitute makes the following changes to 1st edition. Deletes all provisions of previous edition and replaces them with AN ACT TO AMEND THE CASTLE DOCTRINE, TO ALLOW PERSONS WITH CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMITS TO CARRY A HANDGUN IN A PARK, AND TO AUTHORIZE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, OR THEIR INVESTIGATORS WHO HAVE A VALID CONCEALED HANDGUN PERMIT TO CARRY A CONCEALED WEAPON ON CERTAIN PREMISES OR IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. Repeals GS 14-51.1 (use of deadly force against an intruder) and enacts new GS 14-51.2 providing that a person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to self or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the following apply: (1) the person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had so entered, the house, motor vehicle, or workplace, or had removed or attempted to remove another from the home, vehicle, or workplace and (2) the person using the defensive force knew or had reason to believe that such unlawful and forcible entry or removal had occurred. Provides that the presumption is rebuttable and does not apply if (1) the person against whom the force was used had a right to be in the home, vehicle, or workplace, and there is not a protective or no contact order against that person; (2) the person removed or sought to be removed is a child or grandchild or is otherwise under lawful custody or guardianship of the person against whom the defensive force is used; (3) the person using the force is engaged in other unlawful activity; (4) the person against whom the force is used is a law enforcement officer acting in the lawful performance of the officer’s official duties, and who has made his or her status as a law enforcement officer known or the person using force should have known the individual was an officer; or (5) the person against whom the force is used has discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter and has exited the home, vehicle, or workplace. Provides that a person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another’s home, vehicle, or workplace is presumed to be doing so with intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. Provides immunity for a person using force as justified by circumstances described above. Defines terms as used in the proposed new statute.
Enacts new GS 14-51.3 providing that a person may use force, but not deadly force, in the defense of self or of others if the person reasonably believes that the use of force is a necessary defense against the imminent use of unlawful force by another. However, provides that a person is justified in the use of deadly force and has no duty to retreat in any place the person has the lawful right to be if: (1) the person reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm to self or to another or (2) under the circumstances permitted under proposed GS 14-51.2. Provides that a person who uses force as permitted in proposed GS 14-51.3 is immune from civil or criminal liability except if the person against whom the force is used is a law enforcement officer acting lawfully in the performance of the officer’s official duties and the officer provided identification or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer lawfully performing the officer’s official duties.
Amends GS 14-269(b) by creating a new subsection to include the following persons as those exempt from the prohibition against carrying a concealed firearm: any person who is a district attorney, an assistant district attorney, or an investigator employed by the office of a district attorney and who has a valid concealed handgun permit; provided the person may not carry the firearm in the courtroom, and may not carry a concealed weapon at any time while consuming alcohol or while alcohol or an unlawful controlled substance remains in the person’s body. The person must keep the firearm in a locked compartment when the weapon is not on their person. Makes clarifying change to GS 14-269(a1)(2).
Enacts new GS 14-415.27 to provide that any person who is a district attorney, an assistant district attorney, or an investigator employed by the office of a district attorney who has a valid concealed handgun permit is not subject to the restrictions and prohibitions set out in GS 14-415.11(c), and may carry a concealed handgun in the areas listed in GS 14-415.11(c) unless prohibited by federal law. Makes a conforming change to GS 14-415.11(c). Enacts new GS 14-415.11(c1) allowing a person with a valid concealed handgun permit to carry a concealed handgun on the grounds or waters of a park within the State Parks System, as defined. Makes a conforming change. Amends GS 14-415.23, adding that a local government may adopt an ordinance to prohibit, by posting, the carrying of a concealed weapon on municipal and county recreational facilities specifically identified by the local government. Allows a permittee to still secure a handgun in a locked vehicle.
Effective December 1, 2011, and applies to offenses committed on or after that date. Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of the act are not abated or affected by the act, and the statues that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.