THE CASTLE DOCTRINE.

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View NCGA Bill Details2011-2012 Session
Senate Bill 34 (Public) Filed Thursday, February 3, 2011
TO CLARIFY WHEN A PERSON MAY USE DEFENSIVE FORCE TO PROTECT AGAINST THE UNLAWFUL AND FORCIBLE ENTRY INTO THE PERSON'S DWELLING BY ANOTHER, TO PREVENT THE REMOVAL OF A PERSON AGAINST HIS OR HER WILL FROM THE PERSON'S DWELLING, AND TO PROVIDE THAT A PERSON IS JUSTIFIED IN USING DEFENSIVE FORCE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SO IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CIVIL ACTION FOR THE USE OF SUCH FORCE.
Intro. by Brock, D. Berger, Harrington.

Status: Assigned To Judiciary Subcommittee C (House Action) (May 31 2011)

Bill History:

S 34

Bill Summaries:

  • Summary date: Feb 24 2011 - View Summary

    Senate amendment makes the following change to 2nd edition.
    Makes a technical conforming change.


  • Summary date: Feb 22 2011 - View Summary

    Senate committee substitute makes the following changes to 1st edition. Amends the long title to AN ACT TO PROVIDE WHEN A PERSON MAY USE DEFENSIVE FORCE, INCLUDING FORCE THAT IS INTENDED OR LIKELY TO CAUSE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM, AND TO CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT A PERSON IS PRESUMED TO HAVE HELD A REASONABLE FEAR OF IMMINENT PERIL OF DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY HARM IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.
    Defense of home, motor vehicle, or workplace. Amends proposed GS 14-51.2 adding definitions for home, motor vehicle, and workplace. Deletes definitions for criminal prosecution, dwelling and residence. Adds the definition for home and includes the concept of curtilage (the area of land immediately surrounding a home that is enclosed or considered to be enclosed) in that definition. Adds workplace and motor vehicle to the places where a lawful occupant who uses defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm (was, fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm) to self or to another. Deletes the words “dwelling or residence” wherever they appear and replaces them with “home, motor vehicle, or workplace.” Provides that a person who uses force as permitted by this proposed statute in defense of home, motor vehicle, or workplace is immune from criminal and civil liability (was, criminal prosecution and civil action) except if the force is used against a law enforcement officer acting lawfully (was, acting) in the performance of the officer’s official duties and the officer provided identification or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer lawfully acting in performance of the officer’s official duties. Clarifies that the presumption applies to a lawful occupant of the home, motor vehicle, or the workplace (was, applies to a person). Adds that a lawful occupant of the home, motor vehicle, or the workplace has no duty to retreat. Preserves all applicable common law defenses.
    Defense of self or another. Enacts new GS 14-51.3 providing that a person may use force, but not deadly force, in the defense of self or of others if the person reasonably believes that the use of force is a necessary defense against the imminent use of unlawful force by another. However, provides that a person is justified in the use of deadly force and has no duty to retreat in any place the person has the lawful right to be if: (1) the person reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to self or to another; or under the circumstances permitted under proposed GS 14-51.2. Provides that a person who uses force as permitted in proposed GS 14-51.3 is immune from civil or criminal liability except if the person against whom the force is used is a law enforcement officer acting lawfully in the performance of the officer’s official duties and the officer provided identification or the person using the force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer lawfully acting in performance of the officer’s official duties.


  • Summary date: Feb 3 2011 - View Summary

    Repeals GS 14-51.1 (use of deadly force against an intruder) and enacts new GS 14-51.2 providing that a person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to self or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if both of the following apply: (1) the person against whom the force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had so entered, a dwelling, or had removed or attempted to remove another from the dwelling and (2) the person using the deadly force knew or had reason to believe that such unlawful and forcible entry or removal had occurred.
    The presumption does not apply if (1) the person against whom the force was used had a right to be in the dwelling and there is not a protective or no contact order against that person, (2) the person removed or sought to be removed is a child or grandchild or is otherwise under lawful custody or guardianship of the person against whom the defensive force is used, (3) the person using the force is engaged in other unlawful activity, (4) the person against whom the force is used is a law enforcement officer acting in the lawful performance of the officer’s official duties and who has made known his status as a law enforcement officer or the person using force should have known the individual was an officer, or (5) the person against whom the force is used has discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter the dwelling or residence and has exited the dwelling or residence.
    Provides that a person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter another’s dwelling is presumed to be doing so with intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.
    Provides immunity for a person using force as justified by circumstances described above.
    Defines terms as used in the proposed new section.
    Effective December 1, 2011, and applies to offenses committed on or after that date. Provides that prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date are not abated or affected by this act and the statutes that would be applicable to such offenses were it not for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions.